how in a world of natural and mechanical law one could free human beings from the conclusion that their behavior was fully as determined as the behavior of material substances.8
Edwards's Calvinism, entwined around the classic Calvinist dogma of divine predestination, might at first seem a poor platform for effecting such a deliverance. But Edwards argued that the perception of ideas by the mind is so linked with the action of the will, that willing may simply be described as being "as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable, is. .. ." So direct was the connection between knowing and willing that the simple perception by the mind of what Edwards called a "motive" is sufficient to trigger a volition. Hence, Edwards reasoned, if God presents appropriate motives to human perception, the close connection between perception and willing will guarantee the appropriate response, without God ever having to impose any kind of physical or material power upon a human subject.9
For those who were unconvinced that this relieved Calvinism of charges of "necessity" and "inability," Edwards responded with his famous dichotomy between "natural ability" and "moral inability"-that all human beings possess full natural ability to will freely, even though their depraved spiritual natures ensure that they never will do so how in a world of natural and mechanical law one could free human beings from the conclusion that their behavior was fully as determined as the behavior of material substances.8
For those who were unconvinced that this relieved Calvinism of charges of "necessity" and "inability," Edwards responded with his famous dichotomy between "natural ability" and "moral inability"-that all human beings possess full natural ability to will freely, even though their depraved spiritual natures ensure that they never will do so due to a "moral inability." But far from this excusing unrepentant sinners, "moral inability" is precisely what sinners customarily were blamed for, especially when they possessed full natural ability to do otherwise. Edwards's disciples were thus free to call sinners to repentance and revival on the ground of every sinner's natural ability, while carefully protecting their Calvinistic integrity by insisting that total depravity ensured an utter moral inability for repentance by sinners unaided by divine grace.
This novel attempt to have both free will and determinism required that Edwards and his New Divinity followers perform several crucial alterations in the basic contours of Calvinistic psychology. In the first place, Edwards's insistence that the will freely moves toward what the mind perceives as motives could easily come acropper on the question of why two people might respond to the same motive in different ways. By contrast, the textbook version of Calvinism, based on the Westminster Confession and mediated through the Scottish-influenced agency of Princeton Presbyterians Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge, accounted for the differences in these perceptions by the differences in spiritual substance between saints and sinners, which compelled saints to love one motive and sinners hate it. But that presupposed the existence of a substantial moral "nature" lying beneath the working consciousness, and that assumption sat uneasily beside Edwards's insistence that willing was an unhindered movement from perception to willing. A morally depraved spiritual substance that determined the receptiveness of the consciousness to ideas seemed to suggest a natural inability to respond to certain motives that would undercut all of Edwards's elaborate insistence on human freedom as natural ability. How much Edwards felt this tension as a Calvinist theologian is unclear, although in his posthumously published treatise on Original Sin (1758), Edwards sought to soften the notion of a fixed spiritual substance by redefining human "nature" rather vaguely as an "arbitrary divine constitution" which "continually preserves" human personality. 0 These innovations puzzled, and sometimes appalled, not only the Arminians and quasi-Unitarians with whom Edwards had struggled during the Great Awakening, but even many orthodox "Old Calvinists" in New England and strict-subscription Presbyterians in Pennsyl- due to a "moral inability." But far from this excusing unrepentant sinners, "moral inability" is precisely what sinners customarily were blamed for, especially when they possessed full natural ability to do otherwise. Edwards's disciples were thus free to call sinners to repentance and revival on the ground of every sinner's natural ability, while carefully protecting their Calvinistic integrity by insisting that total depravity ensured an utter moral inability for repentance by sinners unaided by divine grace.
This novel attempt to have both free will and determinism required that Edwards and his New Divinity followers perform several crucial alterations in the basic contours of Calvinistic psychology. In the first place, Edwards's insistence that the will freely moves toward what the mind perceives as motives could easily come acropper on the question of why two people might respond to the same motive in different ways. By contrast, the textbook version of Calvinism, based on the Westminster Confession and mediated through the Scottish-influenced agency of Princeton Presbyterians Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge, accounted for the differences in these perceptions by the differences in spiritual substance between saints and sinners, which compelled saints to love one motive and sinners hate it. But that presupposed the existence of a substantial moral "nature" lying beneath the working consciousness, and that assumption sat uneasily beside Edwards's insistence that willing was an unhindered movement from perception to willing. A morally depraved spiritual substance that determined the receptiveness of the consciousness to ideas seemed to suggest a natural inability to respond to certain motives that would undercut all of Edwards's elaborate insistence on human freedom as natural ability. How much Edwards felt this tension as a Calvinist theologian is unclear, although in his posthumously published treatise on Original Sin (1758), Edwards sought to soften the notion of a fixed spiritual substance by redefining human "nature" rather vaguely as an "arbitrary divine constitution" which "continually preserves" human personality. 0 These innovations puzzled, and sometimes appalled, not only the Arminians and quasi-Unitarians with whom Edwards had struggled during the Great Awakening, but even many orthodox "Old Calvinists" in New England and strict-subscription Presbyterians in Pennsyl-vania and New Jersey, who suspected that the redefinition of spiritual substance and a hankering to hitch Calvinism to talk about natural ability would come to no good end. The New Divinity, who considered themselves the most radical and consistent Edwardseans, felt no such qualms. Samuel Hopkins (who had been tutored in theology by Edwards during the height of the Great Awakening) developed Edwards's definition of true virtue into an ethic of absolute "universal disinterested benevolence." Joseph Bellamy, with Edwards's blessing (in the form of the preface to Bellamy's True Religion Delineated in 1750), reworked the outlines of the atonement and justification to introduce a governmental and unlimited atonement into New Divinity doctrine, and to replace the Westminster definition of justification as a matter of imputed divine righteousness with a 'realistic' idea of justification in which the death of Jesus Christ conferred, not merit upon sinners but an opportunity for God to forgive, provided the sinner was fully employing natural ability to exert disinterested benevolence."
Above all, explaining, defending and demanding the full natural ability of the will became the unceasing work of New Divinity preachers. Nathanael Emmons, who was often marked out as the most ultra of the New Divinity preachers, was so determined to preach up natural ability that he untied the will from any connection to spiritual substance, and defined all human consciousness as a phenomenological series of "exercises" upheld only by God's "constitution." He thus set his "Exercise Scheme" off from more hesitant New Divinity men such as Asa Burton, whose "Taste Scheme" retained some notion of a spiritual substratum in the form of an underlying "taste" for good or evil. And as they pressed to the outer logic of natural ability, they came at last to the suggestion that when the right use of one's ability combined with the demand for disinterested benevolence, then the goal of true Christian life could hardly be less than Christian perfection.l2 On the vania and New Jersey, who suspected that the redefinition of spiritual substance and a hankering to hitch Calvinism to talk about natural ability would come to no good end. The New Divinity, who considered themselves the most radical and consistent Edwardseans, felt no such qualms. Samuel Hopkins (who had been tutored in theology by Edwards during the height of the Great Awakening) developed Edwards's definition of true virtue into an ethic of absolute "universal disinterested benevolence." Joseph Bellamy, with Edwards's blessing (in the form of the preface to Bellamy's True Religion Delineated in 1750), reworked the outlines of the atonement and justification to introduce a governmental and unlimited atonement into New Divinity doctrine, and to replace the Westminster definition of justification as a matter of imputed divine righteousness with a 'realistic' idea of justification in which the death of Jesus Christ conferred, not merit upon sinners but an opportunity for God to forgive, provided the sinner was fully employing natural ability to exert disinterested benevolence."
Above all, explaining, defending and demanding the full natural ability of the will became the unceasing work of New Divinity preachers. Nathanael Emmons, who was often marked out as the most ultra of the New Divinity preachers, was so determined to preach up natural ability that he untied the will from any connection to spiritual substance, and defined all human consciousness as a phenomenological series of "exercises" upheld only by God's "constitution." He thus set his "Exercise Scheme" off from more hesitant New Divinity men such as Asa Burton, whose "Taste Scheme" retained some notion of a spiritual substratum in the form of an underlying "taste" for good or evil. And as they pressed to the outer logic of natural ability, they came at last to the suggestion that when the right use of one's ability combined with the demand for disinterested benevolence, then the goal of true Christian life could hardly be less than Christian perfection.l2 On the New Divinity's logic, if all sinners had full natural ability to repent, there was little point in nudging them into such traditional New England church practices as the half-way covenant or the "use of the means." These practices were predicated on the assumption that the self could be known only with difficulty and only by a gradual process of interpretation based on "means" such as church attendance, Biblereading, and prayer for a "new heart" in order to repent. For the Edwardseans, full self-consciousness led to full natural ability, and full natural ability meant that the "means" became obstacles (and perhaps even sly delaying tactics); instead, the sinner should be commanded to use full natural ability to repent immediately and stop prevaricating.
It was, quite literally, in the atmosphere of New Divinity Calvinism that Finney was born in 1792 in the New Divinity stronghold of western Connecticut. He was raised among the Edwardsean-influenced "Presbygational" church unions of Congregationalists and Presbyterians in upstate New York. And it was in that same context that he received his mature education in 1812-14 in Peter Starr's New Divinity parish of Warren, Connecticut, and was ordained in 1824 in the New School Oneida Presbytery as an evangelist. Far more than any possible Wesleyanism, Arminianism, Jacksonianism, or antinomianism, it was the influence of this New Divinity Edwardseanism that colored his preaching and teaching as a fabulously successful revivalist in upstate New York, Pennsylvania, and New England from 1824 to 1832. Oddly, whatever the difficulties experienced by modern interpreters in discerning these influences, those who were closest to Finney saw this quite clearly. James Harris Fairchild, who became Finney's pupil when Finney moved to Oberlin College in Ohio in 1835 (and who eventually became his successor as president of Oberlin), insisted that Finney did "not differ in any essential feature from the view of Edwards and Samuel Hopkins," and he characterized "the Ethical Philosophy inculcated by Mr. Finney & his associates of later times" as being "that of the elder Edwards, which makes well-being or blessedness of the sentient universe the summum bonum or ultimate grace, & . . . benevolence, the grand element of all virtue." Henry Cowles, another of Finney's faculty colleagues at Oberlin and long-time editor of Finney's mouthpiece, The Oberlin Evangelist, declared that while "it has never been our habit to commend our orthodoxy, by affirming our agreement with any human standards," nevertheless "it may safely be said that we should choose to name the theology commonly known as that of New England . . . and as, years ago, expounded by Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins." George Frederick Wright, another of Finney's Oberlin students and Finney's first major biographer, insisted that Finney "shows many indubitable New Divinity's logic, if all sinners had full natural ability to repent, there was little point in nudging them into such traditional New England church practices as the half-way covenant or the "use of the means." These practices were predicated on the assumption that the self could be known only with difficulty and only by a gradual process of interpretation based on "means" such as church attendance, Biblereading, and prayer for a "new heart" in order to repent. For the Edwardseans, full self-consciousness led to full natural ability, and full natural ability meant that the "means" became obstacles (and perhaps even sly delaying tactics); instead, the sinner should be commanded to use full natural ability to repent immediately and stop prevaricating.
It was, quite literally, in the atmosphere of New Divinity Calvinism that Finney was born in 1792 in the New Divinity stronghold of western Connecticut. He was raised among the Edwardsean-influenced "Presbygational" church unions of Congregationalists and Presbyterians in upstate New York. And it was in that same context that he received his mature education in 1812-14 in Peter Starr's New Divinity parish of Warren, Connecticut, and was ordained in 1824 in the New School Oneida Presbytery as an evangelist. Far more than any possible Wesleyanism, Arminianism, Jacksonianism, or antinomianism, it was the influence of this New Divinity Edwardseanism that colored his preaching and teaching as a fabulously successful revivalist in upstate New York, Pennsylvania, and New England from 1824 to 1832. Oddly, whatever the difficulties experienced by modern interpreters in discerning these influences, those who were closest to Finney saw this quite clearly. James Harris Fairchild, who became Finney's pupil when Finney moved to Oberlin College in Ohio in 1835 (and who eventually became his successor as president of Oberlin), insisted that Finney did "not differ in any essential feature from the view of Edwards and Samuel Hopkins," and he characterized "the Ethical Philosophy inculcated by Mr. Finney & his associates of later times" as being "that of the elder Edwards, which makes well-being or blessedness of the sentient universe the summum bonum or ultimate grace, & . . . benevolence, the grand element of all virtue." Henry Cowles, another of Finney's faculty colleagues at Oberlin and long-time editor of Finney's mouthpiece, The Oberlin Evangelist, declared that while "it has never been our habit to commend our orthodoxy, by affirming our agreement with any human standards," nevertheless "it may safely be said that we should choose to name the theology commonly known as that of New England . . . and as, years ago, expounded by Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins." George Frederick Wright, another of Finney's Oberlin students and Finney's first major biographer, insisted that Finney "shows many indubitable New Divinity's logic, if all sinners had full natural ability to repent, there was little point in nudging them into such traditional New England church practices as the half-way covenant or the "use of the means." These practices were predicated on the assumption that the self could be known only with difficulty and only by a gradual process of interpretation based on "means" such as church attendance, Biblereading, and prayer for a "new heart" in order to repent. For the Edwardseans, full self-consciousness led to full natural ability, and full natural ability meant that the "means" became obstacles (and perhaps even sly delaying tactics); instead, the sinner should be commanded to use full natural ability to repent immediately and stop prevaricating. Oberlin Evangelist, declared that while "it has never been our habit to commend our orthodoxy, by affirming our agreement with any human standards," nevertheless "it may safely be said that we should choose to name the theology commonly known as that of New England . . . and as, years ago, expounded by Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins." George Frederick Wright, another of Finney's Oberlin students and Finney's first major biographer, insisted that Finney "shows many indubitable New Divinity's logic, if all sinners had full natural ability to repent, there was little point in nudging them into such traditional New England church practices as the half-way covenant or the "use of the means." These practices were predicated on the assumption that the self could be known only with difficulty and only by a gradual process of interpretation based on "means" such as church attendance, Biblereading, and prayer for a "new heart" in order to repent. For the Edwardseans, full self-consciousness led to full natural ability, and full natural ability meant that the "means" became obstacles (and perhaps even sly delaying tactics); instead, the sinner should be commanded to use full natural ability to repent immediately and stop prevaricating. Oberlin Evangelist, declared that while "it has never been our habit to commend our orthodoxy, by affirming our agreement with any human standards," nevertheless "it may safely be said that we should choose to name the theology commonly known as that of New England . . . and as, years ago, expounded by Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins." George Frederick Wright, another of Finney's Oberlin students and Finney's first major biographer, insisted that Finney "shows many indubitable New Divinity's logic, if all sinners had full natural ability to repent, there was little point in nudging them into such traditional New England church practices as the half-way covenant or the "use of the means." These practices were predicated on the assumption that the self could be known only with difficulty and only by a gradual process of interpretation based on "means" such as church attendance, Biblereading, and prayer for a "new heart" in order to repent. For the Edwardseans, full self-consciousness led to full natural ability, and full natural ability meant that the "means" became obstacles (and perhaps even sly delaying tactics); instead, the sinner should be commanded to use full natural ability to repent immediately and stop prevaricating. Oberlin Evangelist, declared that while "it has never been our habit to commend our orthodoxy, by affirming our agreement with any human standards," nevertheless "it may safely be said that we should choose to name the theology commonly known as that of New England . . . and as, years ago, expounded by Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins." George Frederick Wright, another of Finney's Oberlin students and Finney's first major biographer, insisted that Finney "shows many indubitable New Divinity's logic, if all sinners had full natural ability to repent, there was little point in nudging them into such traditional New England church practices as the half-way covenant or the "use of the means." These practices were predicated on the assumption that the self could be known only with difficulty and only by a gradual process of interpretation based on "means" such as church attendance, Biblereading, and prayer for a "new heart" in order to repent. For the Edwardseans, full self-consciousness led to full natural ability, and full natural ability meant that the "means" became obstacles (and perhaps even sly delaying tactics); instead, the sinner should be commanded to use full natural ability to repent immediately and stop prevaricating. Oberlin Evangelist, declared that while "it has never been our habit to commend our orthodoxy, by affirming our agreement with any human standards," nevertheless "it may safely be said that we should choose to name the theology commonly known as that of New England . . . and as, years ago, expounded by Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins." George Frederick Wright, another of Finney's Oberlin students and Finney's first major biographer, insisted that Finney "shows many indubitable New Divinity's logic, if all sinners had full natural ability to repent, there was little point in nudging them into such traditional New England church practices as the half-way covenant or the "use of the means." These practices were predicated on the assumption that the self could be known only with difficulty and only by a gradual process of interpretation based on "means" such as church attendance, Biblereading, and prayer for a "new heart" in order to repent. For the Edwardseans, full self-consciousness led to full natural ability, and full natural ability meant that the "means" became obstacles (and perhaps even sly delaying tactics); instead, the sinner should be commanded to use full natural ability to repent immediately and stop prevaricating. Oberlin Evangelist, declared that while "it has never been our habit to commend our orthodoxy, by affirming our agreement with any human standards," nevertheless "it may safely be said that we should choose to name the theology commonly known as that of New England . . . and as, years ago, expounded by Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins." George Frederick Wright, another of Finney's Oberlin students and Finney's first major biographer, insisted that Finney "shows many indubitable New Divinity's logic, if all sinners had full natural ability to repent, there was little point in nudging them into such traditional New England church practices as the half-way covenant or the "use of the means." These practices were predicated on the assumption that the self could be known only with difficulty and only by a gradual process of interpretation based on "means" such as church attendance, Biblereading, and prayer for a "new heart" in order to repent. For the Edwardseans, full self-consciousness led to full natural ability, and full natural ability meant that the "means" became obstacles (and perhaps even sly delaying tactics); instead, the sinner should be commanded to use full natural ability to repent immediately and stop prevaricating. The result was that as motives were perceived by the mind, the will responded to those motives without compulsion but also without deliberation. Hence, Finney could say that "By Free-will, I intend the power which moral agent possesses, of choosing in any direction, in view of motives" while at the same time insisting that "Human liberty does not consist in a self-determining power in the will" or "the power to choose anything without a motive, or object of choice. "moral truth" as a motive. "I perceive then in Consciousness that wh[ich] are generally termed motives," and regardless of whether such a motive is "either intrinsically or relatively valuable or the opposite . . . the Will can act and must act in presence of it." The result was that as motives were perceived by the mind, the will responded to those motives without compulsion but also without deliberation. Hence, Finney could say that "By Free-will, I intend the power which moral agent possesses, of choosing in any direction, in view of motives" while at the same time insisting that "Human liberty does not consist in a self-determining power in the will" or "the power to choose anything without a motive, or object of choice." And this position was, as Finney was quick to point out in his Lectures on Systematic Theology, precisely what "Edwards and those of his school" had taught, that choices, volitions, and all acts of will, are determined not by the sovereign power of the agent, but are caused by the objective motive, and that there is the same connection, or a connection as certain and unavoidable between motive and choice as between any physical cause and its effect. .... Such is our mental constitution that the truth of God when thoroughly apprehended cannot fail to interest us. If these truths were clearly revealed to the wickedest man on earth, so that he should apprehend them as realities, it could not fail to rouse up his soul to most intense action.14 A second link to Edwards can be seen in Finney's treatment of natural and moral ability. For many critics, it was precisely the absence of a second stage of deliberation by the will, separate from the first stage of perception, which imposed compulsion and inability on human choice. But in Finney's case, as in Edwards's, the response was to introduce a sharp set of distinctions between the natural and moral abilities to choose. The person whose perceptions of motives to action led to a certain act of choice was only responding in the way the human consciousness had been created; no actual physical force was being exerted upon it, and so it had a full natural ability to choose what it pleased. In more practical terms, the sinners who were presented with motives for conversion did not require abilities to respond to those motives which were beyond their possession (and which could be pleaded as excuses). Such persons had all the natural ability-in terms of the natural endowments of reason, eyes, arms, legs, and so on-that would ever be needed to respond to Finney's preaching.
Finney elaborated this position for students in the Oberlin church well into the 1860s. "Moral agency implies natural ability," he insisted, and so long as that measure of natural ability was in possession of the sinner, the sinner had no excuses to offer God for not repenting. "To plead inability is to accuse God." But that did not mean for Finney, any more than it had for Edwards, that every sinner equally possessed the moral ability to repent apart from divine aid and intervention. "The true doctrine of natural ability is, namely, that every moral agent is really able to do whatever God requires of him," Finney wrote in 1845, but he followed that with the explanation that "We are not able to work out that which is good by virtue of possessing the powers of a moral being, independently of divine light." Those lacking moral ability might conceivably have all the natural ability in the world, but they would never be able to repent without a divinely wrought change in their moral inability; and yet, so long as natural ability was available, the sinner could still be held fully accountable for sinfulness and exhorted to respond and submit to God. "A moral agent can resist any and every truth" and moral agency "implies power to resist any degree of motive that may be brought to bear upon the mind," Finney cheerfully conceded with one hand, and then with the other promptly added, "whether any man ever did or ever will as a matter of fact, resist all truth, is entirely another question." For those in his New York City lecture audiences in 1837 who scoffed that this was merely trifling with words-that any inability meant that the will was no longer free nor the sinner responsibleFinney had one quick solution, and that was to refer them back to Jonathan Edwards:
Here some may object, that if there is a natural ability to be perfect, there is a moral inability, which comes to the same thing, for inability is inability, call it what you will, and if we have moral inability, we are as really unable as if our inability was natural....
The true distinction between natural ability and moral the human consciousness had been created; no actual physical force was being exerted upon it, and so it had a full natural ability to choose what it pleased. In more practical terms, the sinners who were presented with motives for conversion did not require abilities to respond to those motives which were beyond their possession (and which could be pleaded as excuses). Such persons had all the natural ability-in terms of the natural endowments of reason, eyes, arms, legs, and so on-that would ever be needed to respond to Finney's preaching. Finney elaborated this position for students in the Oberlin church well into the 1860s. "Moral agency implies natural ability," he insisted, and so long as that measure of natural ability was in possession of the sinner, the sinner had no excuses to offer God for not repenting. "To plead inability is to accuse God." But that did not mean for Finney, any more than it had for Edwards, that every sinner equally possessed the moral ability to repent apart from divine aid and intervention. "The true doctrine of natural ability is, namely, that every moral agent is really able to do whatever God requires of him," Finney wrote in 1845, but he followed that with the explanation that "We are not able to work out that which is good by virtue of possessing the powers of a moral being, independently of divine light." Those lacking moral ability might conceivably have all the natural ability in the world, but they would never be able to repent without a divinely wrought change in their moral inability; and yet, so long as natural ability was available, the sinner could still be held fully accountable for sinfulness and exhorted to respond and submit to God. "A moral agent can resist any and every truth" and moral agency "implies power to resist any degree of motive that may be brought to bear upon the mind," Finney cheerfully conceded with one hand, and then with the other promptly added, "whether any man ever did or ever will as a matter of fact, resist all truth, is entirely another question." For those in his New York City lecture audiences in 1837 who scoffed that this was merely trifling with words-that any inability meant that the will was no longer free nor the sinner responsibleFinney had one quick solution, and that was to refer them back to Jonathan Edwards:
Here some may object, that if there is a natural ability to be perfect, there is a moral inability, which comes to the same thing, for inability is inability, call it what you will, and if we have moral inability, we are as really unable as if our inability was natural... 
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ability, is this: natural ability relates to the powers and faculties of the mind; Moral ability only to the will. Moral inability is nothing less than unwillingness to do a thing. So it is explained by President Edwards, in his Treatise on the Will, and by writers on the subject. 15 That still left Finney with one other problem, for which he found an Edwardsean solution, and that was to explain what caused this peculiar moral inability to operate in sinners in the first place. While the Taste Schemers among the Edwardseans preferred to explain this moral inability by tinkering with the notion of a depraved underlying spiritual substance, Finney took the route of the most radical Exercisers and abolished any notion of a moral "taste" or "nature" below the horizon of consciousness which controlled moral outcomes. "No act is a moral act, but an ultimate act, choice, or intention of the Will," Finney explained in the Oberlin Evangelist in 1857:
Many old divines hold that there is such a thing as original sin, which however is not transgression of law-is not voluntary action of any sort, but is a certain sinfulness in the very substance of the soul. They hold that all the faculties, parts and powers of the soul are sinful; and this sinfulness they call original sin. This however is not God's teaching, but man's.
To allow any "natural" faculty or endowment the power to control a moral function like choice was merely to impose natural inability, which would have subverted the whole Edwardsean enterprise. Therefore, Finney struggled to eliminate all reference to the supposed moral content of such "dispositions" or "substances" on the grounds that consciousness found no evidence of their existence. Furthermore, such natural faculties as consciousness did attest to (such as the sensibilities, the judgment, or the intellect) had to be zoned off as morally neutral, lest they, too, turn into natural inabilities which the sinner could plead as excuses. "If it is true, as they pretend, that God has given them a nature which is itself sinful, and the necessary actings of ability, is this: natural ability relates to the powers and faculties of the mind; Moral ability only to the will. Moral inability is nothing less than unwillingness to do a thing. So it is explained by President Edwards, in his Treatise on the Will, and by writers on the subject. 15 That still left Finney with one other problem, for which he found an Edwardsean solution, and that was to explain what caused this peculiar moral inability to operate in sinners in the first place. While the Taste Schemers among the Edwardseans preferred to explain this moral inability by tinkering with the notion of a depraved underlying spiritual substance, Finney took the route of the most radical Exercisers and abolished any notion of a moral "taste" or "nature" below the horizon of consciousness which controlled moral outcomes. "No act is a moral act, but an ultimate act, choice, or intention of the Will," Finney explained in the Oberlin Evangelist in 1857:
To allow any "natural" faculty or endowment the power to control a moral function like choice was merely to impose natural inability, which would have subverted the whole Edwardsean enterprise. Therefore, Finney struggled to eliminate all reference to the supposed moral content of such "dispositions" or "substances" on the grounds that consciousness found no evidence of their existence. Furthermore, such natural faculties as consciousness did attest to (such as the sensibilities, the judgment, or the intellect) had to be zoned off as morally neutral, lest they, too, turn into natural inabilities which the sinner could plead as excuses. "If it is true, as they pretend, that God has given them a nature which is itself sinful, and the necessary actings of Finney did not deny the existence of such "appetites and propensities," but he did deny that these "appetites," together with other natural psychological endowments as "reason" and "sensibility," could have moral content or be characterized as morally sinful in and of themselves. Moral character belonged only to the will. "Sin must be voluntary," Finney declared, "The fact is there is either no sin or there is voluntary sin. . . . They consist in the active state of the will, and there can be no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice." Even when, in his first published sermon, Finney announced that sinners were "bound to change their own hearts," he was careful to add that his use of the term heart "is figurative" and is only "that deepseated but voluntary preference of the mind, which lies back of all its other voluntary affections and emotions, andfrom which they take their character." Far from distancing Finney from orthodox New England Calvinism, this was precisely what bound him to the most radical strain of the New Divinity, for it was Nathanael Emmons (and not Finney) who had first dared to preach sermons that confidently called sinners to change their own hearts. And Finney, like the New Divinity, was eager to proclaim to the readers of his theology lectures that "the doctrine we their nature are sin," Finney warned, "it is a good excuse for sin, and in the face of heaven and earth, and at the day of judgment, will be a good plea in justification."16 Only the will could be characterized as "sinful" or not-which was, of course, precisely what moral inability rather than natural inability was all about. "All virtue & vice are voluntary dispositions," Finney argued, and belong only to the will, not a substantial "nature":
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Finney did not deny the existence of such "appetites and propensities," but he did deny that these "appetites," together with other natural psychological endowments as "reason" and "sensibility," could have moral content or be characterized as morally sinful in and of themselves. Moral character belonged only to the will. "Sin must be voluntary," Finney declared, "The fact is there is either no sin or there is voluntary sin. . . . They consist in the active state of the will, and there can be no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice." Even when, in his first published sermon, Finney announced that sinners were "bound to change their own hearts," he was careful to add that his use of the term heart "is figurative" and is only "that deepseated but voluntary preference of the mind, which lies back of all its other voluntary affections and emotions, andfrom which they take their character." Far from distancing Finney from orthodox New England Calvinism, this was precisely what bound him to the most radical strain of the New Divinity, for it was Nathanael Emmons (and not Finney) who had first dared to preach sermons that confidently called sinners to change their own hearts. And Finney, like the New Divinity, was eager to proclaim to the readers of his theology lectures that "the doctrine we their nature are sin," Finney warned, "it is a good excuse for sin, and in the face of heaven and earth, and at the day of judgment, will be a good plea in justification."16 Only the will could be characterized as "sinful" or not-which was, of course, precisely what moral inability rather than natural inability was all about. "All virtue & vice are voluntary dispositions," Finney argued, and belong only to the will, not a substantial "nature":
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Having direct access to the mind, and knowing infinitely well the whole history and state of each individual sinner, He employs that truth which is best adapted to his particular case, and then drives it home with Divine power.... God makes it clear before their minds, and pours in upon their souls a blaze of convincing light which they cannot withstand; and they yield to it, obey God, and are saved.19 context of the natural ability/moral inability dichotomy did that vocabulary show its intellectual consistency. "Religion is the work of man," Finney announced in his Lectures on Revivals of Religion in New York City in 1835; but by that he meant only that it was "something for man to do" because human beings have the natural ability to repent and are held accountable for it. "The question is not whether as a matter of fact men ever do obey God without the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit," Finney explained a decade later, "I hold that they do not." Good works, Finney argued were "in one sense our works, because we do them by our voluntary agency;" but on the other side of this vocabulary, Finney just as strictly added that good works were not "from ourselves, nor in any way by our own agency without God. . . . God was the moving cause of all." In fact, when people attempted to achieve salvation on their own, Finney fully expected they would stumble upon their moral inability, and the resulting frustration over their own religious impotence would mark the real moment of spiritual enlightenment for them. "The history of every self-righteous sinner's conversion and every anxious Christian's sanctification would develop this truth-that deliverance cometh not until their self-righteous efforts were proved, by their own experience, to be utterly vain, and abandoned as useless, and the whole subject thrown upon the sovereign mercy of God." In the end, this act of "submitting a subject to the sovereign mercy of God is that very act of faith, which they should have put forth long before, but which they would not exercise until every other means had been tried in vain." Only when sinners came to appreciate the true depths of their moral inability were they existentially ready to submit to God. At that moment conversion took place, not by human design or initiative, but by "God's special agency by his Holy Spirit":
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